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Abstract 
 
 
 
We examine whether a hospital ?Ɛ quality is affected by the quality provided by other 
hospitals in the same market.  We first set out a theoretical model with regulated 
prices which specifies conditions on demand and cost functions which determine 
whether a hospital will have higher quality when its rivals have higher quality. We 
then apply spatial econometric methods to a sample of English hospitals in 2009-10 
and a set of 16 quality measures including mortality rates, readmission, revision and 
redo rates and three patient reported indicators to examine to examine the 
relationship between the quality of hospitals. We find that ĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?Ɛquality is 
positively associated with the quality of its rivals for seven out of the sixteen quality 
measures and that in no case is there a negative association. In those cases where 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇďǇ ? ?йŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐĂ
ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇďǇ ? ? ?йƚŽ ? ? ?й ?
 
JEL classification: I1, L3 
 
Keywords: Quality; regulated prices; hospitals; competition; spatial econometrics. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1 Introduction
Quality is a key concern for patients and policymakers in health care markets. It is often
argued that encouraging competition among health care providers will improve quality,
especially when prices are xed, as higher quality is then the only way in which hospitals
can attract more patients.1 There is a large empirical literature on the relationship between
quality and competition amongst hospitals (Gaynor and Town, 2011; Gravelle et al, 2012).
The bulk of the literature has been about the US experience but some recent contributions
are on the UK and other European countries. The evidence from the US is mixed. Kessler
and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and Geppert (2005) nd a positive e-ect of competition
on quality, Gowrinsankaran and Town (2003) nd a negative e-ect, Shen (2003) nds
mixed results, and Shortell and Hughes (1988) and Mukamel, Zwanziger and Tomaszewski
(2001) nd no e-ect. Recent work from England where hospitals face xed prices, suggests
that competition increases quality (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor, et al., 2010; Bloom et al.,
2011).
The traditional way to test the e-ect of competition on hospitals quality is to examine
the relationship between quality (often measured by hospital mortality rates) and mea-
sures of competition such as the Herndhal index or the number of rival hospitals. This
traditional approach does not test directly whether and how providers respond to rivals
quality, though this is implicitly the mechanism that underlies such approach.
In this study we test directly whether a hospitals quality responds to the quality of
its rivals. In industrial organisation terms, we test whether qualities are strategic com-
plements, ie whether a provider responds to an increase in quality from rival providers by
increasing quality. We do so using a spatial econometric framework: since hospitals and
patients are geographically dispersed, patients must incur travel costs to receive treatment
and so hospital location a-ects demand. Distance between hospitals also determines the
extent to which decisions by one hospital a-ects decisions by other hospitals. The tradi-
tional approach is akin to testing for an e-ect of competition on quality by estimating a
reduced form relating quality directly to a measure of market structure. Our approach
is akin to estimating reaction functions to test if a providers decisions on quality depend
on the quality decisions of rival providers.
We rst outline a theoretical model of hospital quality competition under regulated
(xed) prices. Hospitals revenues are given by the price of a DRG (eg hip replacement,
coronary bypass) times the number of patients treated. Given that prices are xed, hos-
pitals compete on quality to attract patients. Our theoretical model and derivation of
1Under the DRG system introduced in the US in the early 1980ies for hospital care provided under the
Medicare programme (the public insurance programme that covers the elderly) hospitals are paid a xed
price related to patient diagnoses, rather than to the costs of individual patients. In England a system
of prospective payments based on Health Care Resource Groups (HRGs) has been rolled out since 2002.
Similar payment systems are in place in several other European countries.
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reaction functions builds on the existing literature on quality competition with regulated
prices (Ma and Burgess, 1993; Gaynor, 2006; Gravelle and Sivey, 2010; Brekke, Siciliani
and Straume, 2011) which models quality competition within a Hotelling or Vickrey-Salop
framework. We derive conditions under which providers respond to an increase in rivals
quality by also increasing quality, so that qualities are strategic complements. We show
that qualities are complements (substitutes) if the marginal cost of treatment is increas-
ing (decreasing) or the demand responsiveness increases (decreases) when rivals quality
is higher. Qualities are independent if the marginal cost of treatment is constant and
demand is linear in qualities.
We then test whether qualities are strategic substitutes using cross-section data on
English hospitals in 2009-10 and a set of 16 quality measures including mortality rates,
readmission, revision and redo rates and indicators of patients experience.
We follow the approach suggested by Mobley (2003) and Mobley, Frech and Anselin
(2009). They examine whether prices are strategic substitutes, ie whether each provider
responds to an increase in rivals price by reducing its own price. They do so with a spatial
econometric model in which the e-ect of rivals prices depends on spatial proximity. The
spatial price lag is interpreted as the slope of the reaction function. We adapt their
approach to examine competition on quality (as opposed to competition on price) and
interpret the spatial quality lag as the slope of the reaction function.
We nd that quality responds positively to rivals quality for seven out of the sixteen
quality indicators and it does not respond for the others. When an e-ect is detected (for
overall mortality rates, in-hospital stroke mortality, knee replacement readmissions, stroke
readmission within 28 days, and three indicators on patients experience), an increase in
rivals quality by 10% increases quality by 1.7-2.9%.
Section 2 provides the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the estimation methods
and data. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
Dene qi as the quality of hospital i (i = 1, ..,N). The demand function of hospital i is
Xi = X (qi,q−i; δi) (1)
where q
−i = (q1, ..., qj , ..., qi−1, qi+1, ..., qN) is a vector of the qualities of rival providers.
We assume that the demand function of provider i is increasing in its own quality qi
and decreasing in the quality of the rivals: ∂Xi (qi,q−i) /∂qi > 0, ∂Xi (qi,q−i) /∂qj < 0.
Hospitals are demand substitutes: patients switch to a hospital if its quality is increased
and away from it if a rivals quality is increased. Hospitals are imperfect substitutes
because of travel costs and times, and switching costs. A marginal increase in quality
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qi implies that some but not all patients switch from the other hospitals to hospital i.
This specication is akin to a Cournot quality competition model as opposed to a price
competition model a la Bertrand.
The location of other hospitals and the spatial distribution of patients relative to
hospital i will also a-ect demand for the hospital and we capture these by δi.
Hospitals are prospectively nanced by a third-party payer o-ering a per-treatment
price p and potentially a lump-sum transfer T . We assume that all the patients demanding
treatment in a hospital are treated. The objective function of hospital i is2
πi = T + pXi (qi,q−i; δi)−Ci (Xi (qi,q−i) , qi; γi) , (2)
where the cost of supplying hospital treatments is given by the cost function C (Xi, qi; γi),
with CX > 0, Cq > 0, CXX  0, Cqq > 0 and CXq  0. The last assumption implies that
we allow for both cost substitutability (CXq > 0) and complementarity (CXq < 0) between
quality and output. The marginal cost of treatment to be constant, increasing (due to
congestion, CXX > 0) or decreasing (due to scale economies, CXX < 0). The assumption
of cost substitutability is plausible if the average cost of treatment is increasing in quality
(eg C (Xi, qi; γi) = c(qi; γi)Xi, with cq(qi; γi) > 0). Cost complementarity is also possible
in the presence of learning by doing (with higher volumes reducing the marginal cost of
quality). γi describes exogenous factors, such as input prices, a-ecting hospital i costs.
The hospitals simultaneously and independently choose qualities. Maximising (2) with
respect to qi we obtain the rst order condition
∂Xi (qi,q−i; δi)
∂qi

p−
∂Ci (Xi (qi,q−i; δi) , qi; δi)
∂Xi

=
∂Ci (Xi (qi,q−i; δi) , qi; δi)
∂qi
, (3)
Marginal benet from higher quality is proportional to the di-erence between the price
and the marginal cost of treatment.3
Solving (3) for qi gives the reaction function for hospital i
qRi = q
R
i (q−i; δi, γi). (4)
We are interested in the e-ect of rivals qualities on hospital i quality. Using the
implicit function theorem on (3), we obtain the slope of the reaction function as
∂qRi
∂qj
=

−
∂2πi
∂q2i

−1 
p−
∂Ci
∂Xi

∂2Xi
∂qi∂qj
−

∂Xi
∂qi
∂2Ci
∂X2i
+
∂2Ci
∂qi∂Xi

∂Xi
∂qj

(5)
2We can also allow for hospital altruism by writing the hospital objective function as u(πi, qi,Xi) with
uq > 0 or uX > 0. This would not alter our general conclusion that the e-ect of rivals qualities on qi
depends on properties of the cost and demand functions.
3We assume [∂Xi(0,q−i; δi)/∂qi][p − ∂Ci(Xi(0,q−i; δi), 0; γi)/∂Xi] > ∂Ci(X(0,q−i; δi), 0; γi)/∂qi to
rule out corner solutions.
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where
∂2πi
∂q2i
=

p−
∂Ci
∂Xi

∂2Xi
∂q2i
−
∂Xi
∂qi

∂2Ci
∂Xi∂qi
+
∂2Ci
∂X2i
∂Xi
∂qi

< 0. (6)
is the second order condition.
The reaction function of provider i depends on its demand and cost functions. Since
the rst term in (5) is positive, the sign of ∂qRi /∂qj depends on the terms in the square
brackets. To x ideas, it is useful to consider some special cases.
Suppose that the demand function is linear in qualities so that ∂2Xi/∂qi∂qj = 0
and that the marginal cost of treatment is constant and independent of quality so that
∂2Ci/∂X
2
i = ∂
2Ci/∂qi∂Xi = 0. Then, from (5), we have ∂q
R
i /∂qj = 0: the quality of
provider i is independent of the quality of its rivals.
Suppose next that the demand function is linear in quality

∂2Xi/∂qi∂qj = 0

but
the marginal cost of treatment is increasing with respect to quantity and quality so that
∂2Ci/∂X
2
i > 0 and ∂
2Ci/∂Xi∂qi > 0. Then ∂q
R
i /∂qj > 0 and qualities are strategic
complements. The optimal response to an increase in rivals quality is an increase in
quality. The intuition is that an increase in quality by the rival reduces demand and
therefore output so that the marginal cost of treatment is reduced thus increasing the prot
margin and providers incentive to increase quality. The assumption that the marginal cost
is increasing can be justied in health systems where hospitals have limited capacity.
Conversely, ∂qRi /∂qj < 0 if the marginal cost of treatment is decreasing in quantity
(∂2Ci/∂X2i < 0) and quality (∂
2Ci/∂Xi∂qi < 0). In this case, qualities are strategic
substitutes and the optimal response to an increase in rivals quality is to reduce quality.
The rationale is that an increase in rivals quality now increases the marginal cost of
treatment and therefore reduces the prot margin.
As a nal example, suppose that the marginal cost of treatment is constant and in-
dependent of quality so that ∂2Ci/∂X
2
i = ∂
2Ci/∂Xi∂qi = 0. Then, whether qualities are
strategic complements or substitutes depends on the sign of ∂2Xi/∂qi∂qj. If an increase
in rivals quality increases (reduces) the responsiveness of demand to providers quality,
then qualities are strategic complements (substitutes) and the provider increases (reduces)
quality in response to rivals quality.
2.1 Empirical specication
To test if qualities are strategic complements, strategic substitutes or independent, we
estimate the reaction function as
qRi = fi(q−i, zi, εi) (7)
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where the vector zi captures observed parameters from δi, γi which shift hospital i demand
and cost functions and εi summarises factors we do not observe. We specify a linear spatial
lag model as
qi = α+ ρ

j
wijqj + ziβ + εi (8)
where wij ≥ 0 is a distance weight specied in more detail below and wii = 0.
We can write the model in matrix form
q = α+ ρWq+ zβ + ε. (9)
The coeDcient ρ on the quality spatial lag variable,Wq, determines the sign of the slope
of the reaction function. We use a row-standardised inverse distance matrix with a 30-
minutes travel time threshold. Dene dij as the distance between hospital i and j, and
d30ij as the distance corresponding to 30 minutes travel time between hospital i and j. The
weights are given by:
wij = 0 if i = j
=
d−1ij
j d
−1
ij
if dij ≤ d30ij and i = j
= 0 if dij > d
30
ij and i = j
(10)
The inverse distance specication gives a lower weight to the quality of rivals that are
more distant from hospital i. This row-standardisation permits us to interpret Wq as
a weighted average quality of the rivals, where the weights are inversely related to the
distance between providers (second line). Moreover, the quality of the rivals is included
only if the rival falls within a catchment area of 30 minutes travel time (third line), as in
the traditional approach to hospital competition (e.g. Gaynor et al., 2010).
We estimate (9) by maximum likelihood, since it is consistent and eDcient in the
presence of the spatial lag term, while OLS is biased and inconsistent (Anselin, 1988).
The spatial lag model (9) is often presented in a reduced form as (e.g. Le Gallo et al.,
2003; Mobley, 2003; Mobley et al., 2009):
(I− ρW)q = α+ zβ + ε, (11)
which can be re-arranged as
q = (I− ρW)−1α+ (I− ρW)−1zβ + (I− ρW)−1ε, (12)
or
qi = α

j
aij +

k
βk(

j
aijzjk) +

j
aijεj (13)
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where aij is the element in the i
th row, jth column of (I− ρW)−1.
Equation (13) highlights that the quality of provider i depends not only on its own
characteristics, but also on those of rivals through the spatial multiplier e-ect ((I−ρW)−1).
The error process, (I−ρW)−1ε shows that that a random shock for a specic provider not
only a-ects the quality of this provider, but also has an impact on the quality of the rivals
through the spatial multiplier e-ect (Le Gallo et al., 2003). Such e-ects are propagated
to all hospitals and εj and zij will a-ect qi even if hospital i ignores the quality of hospital
j when choosing qi.
The conventional approach is to solve the simultaneous conditions (3), or equivalently
(4), for the equilibrium qualities qEi = q
E
i (δ,γ) where, in general, the quality in hospital
i depends on the demand and cost functions of all hospitals. To produce an estimatable
specication it is assumed that the equilibrium quality for a hospital depends on a local
subset of the demand and cost conditions for all hospitals: qEi = g(zi, εi). The zi, as in
the spatial specication, include measures of competitive structure such as the number of
rivals within some radius or Herndahl indices. Although the same measures of market
structure may appear in zi in the conventional and spatial specications, they play di-erent
roles. In conventional specications the interest is in testing for an e-ect of competition
by examining the coeDcients on the market structure measures in zi. In the spatial
specication the market structure measures in zi are covariates: the main interest is in
the sign of spatial lag to test whether rivals qualities are strategic complements, which is
a necessary condition for greater competition to increase quality.
3 Data
3.1 Quality measures
Much of the literature on hospital competition and quality has used hospital mortality
for admissions for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) as the measure of hospital quality.
AMI admissions are generally emergencies,where patients exercise a very limited amount
of choice. The justication for using AMI mortality as a quality measure in competition
studies is that it is correlated with quality of care for elective admissions (Cooper et al.,
2011; Gaynor et al., 2011) and easier to measure than direct measures of quality for elective
care. In this paper we use a mix of measures of quality for both elective and emergency
admissions. We examine the correlations amongst them and whether results on the e-ect
of rivals quality on hospital quality are sensitive to the quality measure.
We use 16 measures of hospital quality from Dr Foster4 for the nancial year 2009/10
for 147 hospitals (NHS hospital Trusts). Details on these measures are in the Appendix.
Six of the quality measures are based on standardised mortality rates: i) overall mortality
4http://myhospitalguide.drfosterhealth.co.uk/
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rates; ii) mortality rates from high risk conditions (AMI, stroke, hip fracture, pneumonia,
congestive heart failure); iii) mortality rates from low risk conditions (ie conditions with a
death rate below 0.5%); iv) deaths after surgery; v) in-hospital stroke mortality; and vi)
deaths resulting from hip fracture.
Seven quality measures are standardised readmission, revisions and redo rates: i) read-
missions following hip replacement; ii) readmissions following knee replacement; iii) read-
missions within 28 days following stroke; iv) hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year;
v) knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year; vi) redo rates for prostate resection.
We also measure the proportion of operations within 2 days following hip fracture. Fi-
nally, we have three measures derived from surveys of patients experiences: i) cleanliness
of hospital room/ward; ii) whether the patient was involved in decisions; iii) whether the
patient had Trust in doctors.
For each hospital we dene a catchment area of 30 minutes car drive. The average
number of rivals within 30 minutes car drive is 2.7. On this denition of the catchment
area about one third of all hospitals are monopolists, ie they do not have any other provider
within a 30 minutes car drive. Another third have one or two rivals. 16% have three to
ve rivals, 12% have six to nine rivals, and only 7% have more than nine rivals (up to a
maximum of 14).
We initially exclude monopoly hospitals from our analyses. This reduces the sample
of hospitals from 147 to 99 observations. We check the sensitivity of our results to the
denition of the catchment area by estimating models using catchment areas of 60 minutes
and 98 minutes car drive time. With a catchment area of 60 minutes 142 hospitals have
at least one rival and with a catchment area of 98 minutes all hospitals in England has at
least one rival in the catchment area. The results with larger catchment areas are reported
in section 4.3.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 16 quality measures. Five of the measures
are for emergency admissions, ve are for electives, and six are for both.
Most variables have been normalised to 100. Mortality rates have been computed by
dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number and multiplying the gure
by 100. As an example consider overall mortality rates. The maximum value within the
hospital sample is 118: this implies that the hospital with highest mortality rates has 18%
more than expected mortality rates. The standard deviation is 9.5%. Readmission rates
have a similar scaling. Hip and knee revisions and manipulations have a di-erent scaling,
since these are proportion of replacements with a revision procedure within 365 days of the
initial procedure. The descriptive statistics suggest that on average 1.1% of patients are
in need of a hip revision and manipulation. The rate for knee revisions is 0.6%. The mean
redo rates for prostate section is 4.1%. The proportion of patients with hip fracture who
received an operation within 2 days is on average 67.5%. On average 86% of patients found
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the hospital clean, 70% thought that they were involved in decisions, and 88% thought
that they had condence and Trust in doctors treating them.
3.2 Controls
We use a range of control variables. We construct three dummy variables which are equal
to one if the hospital is respectively a teaching hospital, a Foundation Trust5 or located in
London. Table 1 shows that 20% are teaching hospitals, 52% are Foundation trusts and
24% are located in London. We also have a measure of overall hospital activity (the total
number of inpatient spells), and index of labour costs faced by each hospital, known as the
Market Forces Factor (MFF). On average a hospital has 92000 inpatient spells. The MFF
has an average of 1.03 and varies between 0.9 and 1.2. We also control for the number of
hospitals within a 30 minutes car drive catchment area (there are on average 4 rivals) and
for population density within 15 km from the hospital (which approximately corresponds
to a 30 minutes car drive).
The number of hospitals within the catchment area is one of the measures of market
structure used in conventional studies of competition and quality. By including it in the
model we test if it adds anything to the explanation of hospital quality once we account
for the quality of rivals. We also estimate conventional models with no spatial lag but
including the number of rivals within the catchment area.
4 Results
4.1 Correlation among quality measures
Correlation among dierent mortality rates. Table 2 (top-left quadrant) provides a corre-
lation matrix for the six mortality indicators. Overall mortality rates are highly correlated
with high-risk condition mortality (0.8). This is probably due to high-risk conditions be-
ing a large component of overall mortality rates. They have otherwise a correlation in the
range 0.29-0.35 with other mortality indicators. Mortality rates from high-risk conditions
have correlations in the range 0.25-0.49 with mortality rates other than overall mortality.
Mortality rates from low-risk conditions have a low correlation with any other measure
(in the range 0.14-0.35). The correlation between death after surgery and any other mea-
sure is in the range 0.02-0.29. Deaths resulting from hip fracture have a correlation of
0.37 with mortality rates of high risk conditions (again due to some extent to the rst
being included in the second), of 0.33 with overall mortality and between 0.16-0.2 with
any other mortality indicator. In-hospital stroke mortality rates have a correlation of 0.49
5Foundation trusts were introduced in 2004 as a new type of NHS hospital run by local managers, sta-
and members of the public. They have more nancial and operational freedom than other NHS trusts,
albeit remaining in the public sector.
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with mortality rates of high risk conditions (again due to some extent to the rst being
included in the second), of 0.32 with overall mortality rates and between 0.02-0.16 with
any other mortality indicator.
Correlation among dierent readmission rates, revision rates and redo rates. Table
2 (bottom-right quadrant) gives such correlations. Hip readmissions have a correlation
of 0.32 with knee readmissions and of only 0.07 with stroke readmissions. There is very
low correlation with the other measures (in the range -0.05 to 0.02). Note that, perhaps
surprisingly, there is no correlation between hip readmissions and hip revisions (0.01), and
between hip readmissions and the proportion of operations within 2 days following a hip
fracture (0.02). Knee readmissions have a correlation of 0.32 with hip readmissions and
only 0.09 with stroke readmission. There is very low correlation with other measures (in
the range -0.06 to 0.11). As for hip, there is no correlation between knee readmissions and
knee revisions (-0.06). Stroke readmissions have a low correlation with all other measure
(0.01 to 0.09). Hip and knee revisions have a correlation of 0.38 but there is low correlation
with any other measure (in the range -0.06 to 0.11). Redo rates for prostate resection have
low correlation with any other measure (in the range -0.06 to 0.11). The proportion of hip
fracture patients with an operation within two days has a low correlation with all other
measure (in the range -0.02 to 0.11). Note that this last indicator is a positive quality
measure while the others are negative ones.
Correlation between readmission and mortality rates. Table 2 (top-right quadrant)
also provides the correlation between the di-erent readmission and mortality rates. This
is generally low and varies between -0.18 (knee revisions and mortality from low risk
conditions) and 0.16 (death from hip fracture and stroke readmissions). Note that there
is no correlation between stroke readmission rates and stroke in-hospital mortality rates
(0.04).
Correlation between patients experience and other quality indicators. Table 3 focuses
on patients experience. The three indicators on patients experience have a correlation
which varies between 0.46 and 0.76 (bottom-right quadrant). There is a nearly zero or a
negative correlation between patients experience and the selected mortality rates (from
high risk conditions and from hip fracture) and readmission rates (hip and stroke). The
correlation ranges between 0.02 and -0.24. A negative correlation is to be expected since
higher mortality or readmission rates measure negative outcomes and the patients ex-
perience variables measure positive ones. Therefore, a negative correlation suggests that
providers with better mortality rates also have higher patients satisfaction.
4.2 Regression results
Table 4 provides the results for mortality rates. The rst column suggests that teaching
hospitals have 8.4% lower overall (adjusted) mortality rates. Moreover, an increase in
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rivals quality by 10% increases quality by 2.8%. The second column has similar ndings
with teaching hospitals having 5.8% lower mortality rates from high-risk conditions, and
a signicant and positive coeDcient for hospital activity. However, rivals quality is not
statistically signicant. The third and fourth column refer to mortality from low-risk
conditions, and deaths after surgery. None of the variables signicantly a-ect these two
measures of mortality. The fth column refers to mortality rates following hip fracture.
It suggests that hospitals with a Foundation Trust status have lower mortality rates by
9.3%. The sixth column focuses in-hospital stroke mortality rates. It suggests that an
increase in rivals quality by 10% increases quality by 1.8%.
Table 5 focuses on hip and knee readmissions. Column 1 suggests that hospitals with
higher costs (as proxied by MFF) and higher population density have lower (standardised)
hip readmission rates. Column 2 suggests that teaching hospitals have 23% lower knee
readmission rates. Moreover, an increase in rivals quality by 10% increases quality by
2.3%. Similarly, column 3 suggests that an increase in rivals quality by 10%, as proxied by
stroke readmission rates within 28 days from discharge, increase quality by 1.7%, and that
teaching hospitals have lower readmission rates by 10%. Column 4 suggests that teaching
hospitals have 34% lower hip revision rates; column 5 suggests that higher number of
providers is associated with lower knee revisions rates and population density with higher
knee revisions rates (though the p-value is about 0.12). Column 6 does not nd any
variable to be associated with number of hip fracture operations within two days. In
column 7 higher costs and population density are associated with higher redo rates for
prostate resection.
Results on patients experience are reported in table 6. Column 1 suggests that hos-
pitals with a Foundation Trust status have higher satisfaction on cleanliness by 1.2%. An
increase in rivals quality by 10% increases quality by 1.8%. Column 2 suggests that both
teaching hospitals and hospitals with Foundation Trust status have higher patient satisfac-
tion on patients involvement in decisions by respectively 2.3% and 1.1%. An increase in
rivals quality by 10% increases quality by 2.5%. Finally, column 3 suggests that teaching
hospitals have higher patient satisfaction on doctors trusts by 2%. An increase in rivals
quality by 10% increases quality by 2.9%.
On the whole, the results suggest that teaching hospitals perform better: quality is
signicantly better for seven of the 16 quality measures and no worse for the others. This
is in line with expectation since teaching hospitals tend to attract better qualied doctors.
Although teaching hospitals treat more severely ill patients, this is taken into account by
the case-mix standardisation of the quality measures.
Our key result is that rivals quality either has a positive or no e-ect on providers
quality. We nd a positive e-ect (a positive spatial lag coeDcient) for two mortality rates
(overall and stroke) and for two readmission rates (knee and stroke). The spatial lag
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coeDcient is positive and signicant for all three patient satisfaction measures. A possible
explanation is that patient satisfaction has a greater e-ect on demand than other measures.
Overall mortality rates are also used as a key performance indicator by regulators and
hospitals may compare themselves against nearby hospitals on this measure.
A conventional measure of competition (the number of rivals within 30 minutes car
drive) is not signicant in any of the models. We also estimated the models in Tables 4-6
omitting the number of rivals and nd similar results (available on request).
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We replicate the analyses with the catchment area set to 60 minutes and to 98 minutes
travel time. Larger catchment areas imply that the number of competitors is also larger
and reduces the number of hospitals with no rivals. With a catchment area of 60 minutes
142 hospitals have at least one competitor in the catchment area, so that the sample size
is increased to 142 compared with a 30 minute catchment area.6 With a catchment area
dened by 98 minutes travel time all hospitals in England have at least one rival in the
catchment area.
For each quality indicator and catchment area, we estimate ve regression models
containing
i) the number of rivals weighted by distance;
ii) the spatial lag;
iii) both the spatial lag and the number of rivals weighted by distance;
iv) the number of rivals;
v) both the spatial lag and the number of rivals.
All the models have the same control variables included in Tables 4-6. Tables 7-9 have
results for a catchment area of 60 minutes and Tables 10-12 those for a catchment area of
98 minutes.
The results are broadly consistent and conrm the results in Tables 4-6 for a 30 minute
catchment area. Tables 7 and 10 conrm that, when overall mortality rates are used as
a measure of quality, an increase in rivals quality by 10% increases quality by 3.2-4.2%,
which is higher but in line with the ndings in Table 4. When knee readmission rates
are used as a quality measure in Table 8, an increase in rivals quality by 10% increases
quality by 2.4-2.6%, which is in line with the results in table 5. When a catchment area
of 98 minutes is used (in Table 11), the coeDcient has a similar magnitude but ceases
to be statistically signicant. Tables 9 and 12 conrm that, when quality is measured as
patients involvement in decisions and as trust in doctors, an increase in rivals quality
by 10% increases quality respectively by 2.8-5.5% and 2.1-4.6%, which is in line with the
results provided in table 6.
6We adjust the threshold of the weight matrix (10) to reIect the change of the catchment area.
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5 Conclusions
We have investigated the e-ect of rivals quality using a spatial-econometrics framework.
Our theoretical model implies that the quality of provider responds to the quality of its
rivals when the marginal cost of treatment is increasing and/or the responsiveness of
demand to quality increases in rivals quality. Our empirical analysis using English data
England suggests that this is the case just under half of the 16 quality indicators. We do
not nd any cases where rivals qualities are negatively correlated with provider quality.
Patients satisfaction measures on cleanliness, doctors trust and patients involvement
show the most consistent positive association with rivals quality. Two of six mortality
rates (overall mortality and in-hospital stroke mortality) and two readmission measures
(knee and stroke) respond to rivals quality. When an e-ect is detected and we use a
catchment area of 30 minutes car drive, an increase in rivals quality by 10% increases
quality by approximately 1.7-2.9%. The results are generally robust to the use of larger
catchment areas (of 60 minutes and 98 minutes car drive). Our results are broadly in line
with the model of hospital prices in Mobley et al. (2009) where the spatial lag variable was
found to be 0.23-0.28, which implies that a 10% reduction in rivals price reduces prices
by 2.3-2.8%.
There is always a risk of omitted variable bias in studies such as ours which use
cross-section observational data. In particular, it is possible that the observed positive
association of a hospitals quality with the quality of its potential rivals may be due to them
all being inIuenced by the same unobservable area factors, rather than to competition
amongst hospitals. We have tried to reduce the risk of omitted of variable bias by including
area level variables in our models and in future work plan to use a panel of hospitals. With
this caveat, our results provide some support for the idea that hospitals, at least to some
extent, compete on quality to attract patients. Where qualities are strategic complements,
this also suggests that policies which directly raise quality in one provider will have positive
spillovers onto the quality of other providers within the same market.
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Appendix. Quality Measures
The quality measures are from Dr Foster (2012) Report Card 2009/10, available at:
http://www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/quality-reports, and Dr Foster (2012) Patient Experience
2009/10, available at : http://www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/patient-experience, accessed 14 May 2012.
Mortality rates. Mortality data provided by Dr Foster are risk adjusted. A logistic regression
is used to estimate the expected in-hospital mortality. Each measure is adjusted for di-erences in
case-mix: sex, age on admission, admission method, socioeconomic deprivation, primary diagnosis,
co-morbidities, number of previous emergency admissions, nancial year of discharge, palliative
care, month of admission, ethnicity and source of admission.
The overall standardised mortality rates account for all in-hospital deaths, i.e. all spells whose
method of discharge was death. Stroke and hip fracture mortality rates is restricted to in-hospital
mortality whose spells primary diagnostic was respectively acute cerebrovascular disease (ICD10:
G46, I60-I64, I66) or fracture neck of femur (ICD10: S720-S722). Standardised deaths after surgery
refer to surgical patients who had a secondary diagnosis such as internal bleeding, pneumonia or a
blood clot and subsequently died.
High risk conditions include mortality from spells whose primary diagnosis is one of the these
ve groups: Acute myocardial infarction (ICD10: I21, I22), Acute cerebrovascular disease (ICD10:
G46, I60-I64, I66), Pneumonia (ICD10: A202, A212, A310, A420, A430, A481, A78, B012, B052,
B250, B583, B59, B671, J12-J16, J170-J173, J178, J18, J850, J851), Congestive heart failure -
nonhypertensive (ICD10: I50) and Fracture of neck of femur - hip (ICD10: S720-S722). Low risk
conditions include all in-hospital mortalities from all conditions with a death rate lower than 0.5%.
This includes more than 100 diagnosis groups.
Readmission rates. Dr Foster also provides data on hospital readmissions within 28 days
from discharge for patients admitted for stroke, knee and hip replacement. Stroke, knee and
hip replacement standardised readmission ratios are the ratio of observed number of spells with
emergency readmissions within 28 days of discharge with a knee replacement procedure (proce-
dure/OPCS code O18, W40-W42,W5[234][1389](+Z844-6), W580-2(+Z846)), a hip replacement
procedure (W37-W39, W93-W95) or an acute cerebrovascular disease diagnostic (ICD10: G46,
I60-I64, I66), respectively, to the expected number of readmissions for each procedure estimated
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using a logistic regression that adjusts for factors to indirectly standardise for di-erences in case-
mix (which is the same used for in-hospital mortality standardised ratios). The readmission rate
attributed to a given hospital includes all patients who were treated in that hospital and readmitted
within 28 days in that same hospital or any other hospital.
Revisions. The knee or hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year are the proportion of
joint replacements with a revision procedure within 365 days of the initial (index) procedure, over
the total number of joint replacements carried out at the trust over a three year period. The
measure refers to a three year period since revisions occur infrequently and therefore sample size
may be small in a given year.
Redo rates. Redo rates for prostate resection are the rates of endoscopy resection of outlet
of male bladder procedure (OPCS code: M65) spells where a second operation was performed
within three years (April 2004 and March 2007). More precisely, all spells where another TURP
(transurethral resection of the prostate) procedure was performed within 3 years of the last TURP
procedure are included in the numerator. The denominator includes all TURP procedures dis-
charged between April 2004 and March 2007.
Hip fracture operations within two days. The proportion of hip fracture operations within
two days is the percentage of patients with a fracture neck of femur primary diagnoses (ICD10:
S720-S722) that have received a related procedure (W code) within two days.
Patients experience. Patients experience variables relate to the following three questions
to patients: 1) In your opinion how clean was the hospital room or ward? (Clean hospital
room/ward). The patient could give one of ve possible answers: very clean, fairly clean, not very
clean, not at all clean. Dr Foster measures the proportion of patients who found the hospital or
room very clean or clean. 2) Were you involved as much as you wanted to be in decisions about
your care and treatment? (Involved in decisions). The patient could answer: yes, denitely; yes,
to some extent; no. Dr Foster measures the proportion of patients who answered yes. 3) Did you
have condence and Trust in doctors treating you?" (Trust in doctors). The patient could answer:
yes, always; yes, sometimes; no. Dr Foster measures the percentage of patients who answered yes.
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Table  1. Descriptive  statistics 
Mean SD Min Max 
Quality measures: Type     
Overall mortality rate B 98.28 9.50 71.85 117.93 
Mortality from high risk conditions M 98.46 10.09 73.02 120.59 
Mortality from low risk conditions B 90.29 27.79 31.30 150.92 
Deaths  after  surgery B 98.31 25.50 26.33 157.36 
Deaths  resulting  from hip fracture M 99.96 24.29 43.54 167.87 
In-hospital stroke mortality M 100.91 13.07 76.10 166.07 
Hip replacement readmissions L 109.09 24.24 55.29 175.31 
Knee replacement readmissions L 102.60 36.46 0.00 219.41 
Stroke readmission  within  28 days M 105.91 18.98 60.44 158.08 
Hip revisions and manipulations within  1 year L 1.09 0.63 0.00 3.51 
Knee revisions and manipulations within  1 year L 0.55 0.78 0.00 7.14 
Hip fracture  - Operation given within  2 days M 67.47 11.51 42.83 94.31 
Redo rates  for prostate resection L 4.13 1.99 0.00 9.23 
Clean Hospital  room/ward B 85.95 2.95 79.00 93.70 
Involved in decisions B 69.68 3.31 60.00 77.40 
Trust in doctors B 88.16 2.27 81.50 92.90 
Controls: 
Number  of rivals within  30 minutes  car drive 3.99 3.50 1.00 14.00 
Teaching  hospital 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Foundation Trust 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Total  number  of inpatient spells (in thousands) 91.73 42.09 28.59 216.77 
Staff MFF 1.03 0.10 0.91 1.20 
Population density  within  15km 2217 2046 264.16 7256 
London Trust 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Note.  B: measures quality of both elective and emergency admissions.  M: measures quality of emergency 
admissions. L: measures quality of elective admissions.  
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Table 2. Correlations amongst mortality and readmission variables
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Overall mortality rate 1 0.8 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.13
Mortality from high risk conditions 0.8 1 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.49 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.07
Mortality from low risk conditions 0.35 0.25 1 0.22 0.19 0.14 -0.07 0.11 -0.12 -0.05 -0.18 0.03 -0.04
Deaths after surgery 0.29 0.25 0.22 1 0.2 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16
Deaths from hip fracture 0.33 0.37 0.19 0.2 1 0.16 -0.04 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.32 0.49 0.14 0.02 0.16 1 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.02
Hip replacement readmissions 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 1 0.32 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05
Knee replacement readmissions -0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 0.32 1 0.09 0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01
Stroke readmission -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.09 1 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.08
Hip revisions & manipulations within 1 year 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.04 1 0.38 0.09 -0.06
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year -0.09 -0.16 -0.18 -0.11 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.38 1 0.02 0.01
Hip fracture operation within 2 days -0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 1 0.11
Redo rates for prostate resection -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.16 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.11 1
Note: absolute value of correlation of at least 0.21 required for significance at 1%. Correlations in bold above the diagonal are between measures
of emergency care quality and those in bold below the diagonal are between measures of elective care quality.
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Table 3. Correlations amongst satisfaction, mortality, and readmissions
Mortality from
high risk
conditions
Deaths from hip
fracture
Hip
replacement
readmissions
Stroke
readmission
Clean Hospital
room/ward
Involved in
decisions
Trust in
doctors
Mortality from high
risk conditions 1 0.37 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.15
Deaths resulting from
hip fracture 0.37 1 -0.04 0.17 0.03 -0.04 -0.06
Hip replacement
readmissions 0.04 -0.04 1 0.07 -0.1 -0.18 -0.04
Stroke readmission -0.03 0.17 0.07 1 -0.17 -0.24 -0.22
Clean Hospital
room/ward 0.02 0.03 -0.1 -0.17 1 0.5 0.46
Involved in decisions -0.14 -0.04 -0.18 -0.24 0.5 1 0.76
Trust in doctors -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 -0.22 0.46 0.76 1
Note: absolute correlation of 0.21 required for significance at 1%.
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Table 4. Spatial models of hospital competition and risk adjusted mortality rates
Overall
mortality rate
Mortality
from high risk
conditions
Mortality from
low risk
conditions
Deaths
after
surgery
Deaths from hip
fracture
In-hospital stroke
mortality
Number rivals within 30 min
Teaching Hospital
Foundation Trust
Total inpatient spells (1000)
Staff MFF
Populationdensity within 15km
London Trust
Constant
ρ (spatial quality lag)
0.962
(0.123)
-8.430***
(0.001)
-2.174
(0.210)
0.0189
(0.380)
-22.85
(0.110)
-0.00242
(0.114)
4.013
(0.460)
96.59***
(0.000)
0.276***
(0.004)
0.87
(0.230)
-5.782**
(0.041)
-0.970
(0.630)
0.0463*
(0.064)
-26.12
(0.118)
-0.00214
(0.227)
3.688
(0.559)
107.0***
(0.000)
0.164
(0.102)
-0.860
(0.705)
4.248
(0.633)
1.957
(0.757)
-0.0139
(0.858)
9.959
(0.846)
0.000447
(0.936)
-2.535
(0.898)
86.39
(0.114)
-0.0438
(0.699)
-0.851
(0.660)
-1.728
(0.821)
-3.852
(0.477)
0.0144
(0.831)
-15.92
(0.717)
0.00186
(0.696)
-21.01
(0.217)
115.2**
(0.015)
0.0511
(0.643)
-0.388
(0.840)
-8.102
(0.280)
-9.307*
(0.083)
-0.0179
(0.787)
-44.87
(0.303)
0.00136
(0.773)
-2.334
(0.889)
150.5***
(0.001)
0.0276
(0.807)
0.633
(0.538)
-2.736
(0.497)
-0.161
(0.955)
0.00880
(0.805)
-5.235
(0.821)
0.00139
(0.580)
-6.480
(0.471)
83.91***
(0.001)
0.179*
(0.100)
sigma2
Observations
AIC
BIC
57.09***
(0.000)
99
704.316
730.267
77.01***
(0.000)
99
732.020
757.972
757.1***
(0.000)
99
957.346
983.297
550.7***
(0.000)
99
925.847
951.798
542.8***
(0.000)
99
924.354
950.305
154.4***
(0.000)
99
801.092
827.043
p-values in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5. Spatial models of hospital competition and risk-adjusted readmission, revision and redo rates
Hip
replacement
readmissions
Knee
replacement
readmissions
Stroke
readmission
within 28 days
Hip revisions and
manipulations
within 1 year
Knee revisions
and
manipulations
within 1 year
Hip fracture
operation given
within 2 days
Redo rates for
prostate
resection
Number of rivals
within 30 minutes
Teaching Hospital
Foundation Trust
Total number of
inpatient spells (1000)
Staff MFF
Populationdensity
within 15km
London Trust
Constant
ρ (spatial quality lag)
2.295
(0.224)
4.088
(0.579)
-4.279
(0.420)
0.0137
(0.833)
120.7***
(0.005)
-0.00845*
(0.067)
39.90**
(0.015)
237.7***
(0.000)
-0.0415
(0.706)
2.939
(0.295)
-23.41**
(0.033)
0.451
(0.954)
0.136
(0.163)
-30.52
(0.630)
-0.00256
(0.710)
12.02
(0.626)
93.60
(0.164)
0.225**
(0.021)
-0.383
(0.792)
-10.00*
(0.075)
-2.431
(0.546)
-0.0228
(0.648)
19.25
(0.558)
0.00455
(0.199)
-11.66
(0.352)
68.00**
(0.046)
0.167*
(0.100)
0.0347
(0.489)
-0.336*
(0.088)
0.0279
(0.841)
0.000649
(0.707)
0.822
(0.471)
-0.0000263
(0.830)
0.0316
(0.942)
0.163
(0.889)
-0.00910
(0.936)
-0.0904
(0.122)
-0.137
(0.548)
0.139
(0.392)
-0.00125
(0.536)
0.838
(0.526)
0.000221
(0.122)
0.159
(0.756)
-0.295
(0.830)
-0.194
(0.163)
0.0826
(0.928)
0.220
(0.951)
3.025
(0.236)
-0.0292
(0.358)
26.11
(0.207)
0.000251
(0.911)
-3.427
(0.668)
44.05**
(0.049)
-0.0357
(0.740)
-0.181
(0.209)
0.267
(0.633)
0.309
(0.440)
0.00965*
(0.052)
10.08***
(0.002)
0.000586*
(0.098)
-1.827
(0.144)
-7.406**
(0.028)
-0.0143
(0.899)
sigma2
Observations
AIC
BIC
521.5***
(0.000)
99
920.426
946.377
1157.7***
(0.000)
99
1001.250
1027.201
304.2***
(0.000)
99
868.042
893.993
0.368***
(0.000)
99
201.920
227.872
0.502***
(0.000)
99
234.141
260.092
123.6***
(0.000)
99
777.916
803.867
3.023***
(0.000)
99
410.475
436.426
p-values in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6. Spatial models of hospital competition and patient experience
Clean Hospital room/ward Involved in decisions Trust in doctors
Number of rivals within 30 minutes
Teaching Hospital
Foundation Trust
Total number of inpatient spells
(1000)
Staff MFF
Population density within 15km
London Trust
Constant
ρ (spatial quality lag)
0.0245
(0.903)
1.126
(0.148)
1.181**
(0.035)
0.00532
(0.441)
-3.750
(0.427)
-0.000113
(0.818)
-1.026
(0.555)
73.50***
(0.000)
0.179*
(0.070)
0.0849
(0.709)
2.322***
(0.009)
1.096*
(0.083)
0.00139
(0.859)
-5.856
(0.261)
-0.000230
(0.680)
0.0368
(0.985)
57.66***
(0.000)
0.245**
(0.012)
0.202
(0.167)
1.988***
(0.000)
0.399
(0.326)
-0.000366
(0.942)
-6.670**
(0.050)
-0.000294
(0.414)
0.237
(0.852)
69.02***
(0.000)
0.285***
(0.003)
sigma2
Observations
AIC
BIC
5.854***
(0.000)
99
477.100
503.052
7.567***
(0.000)
99
503.607
529.558
3.122***
(0.000)
99
416.832
442.783
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7.  Spatial models of hospital competition and risk adjusted mortality rates (60 minutes car 
drive time catchment areas) 
Competition
measure: number 
of rivals weighted 
by distance 
Competition
measure:  number 
of rivals 
ρ
(Spatial quality 
lag) 
BIC
Overall mortality rate 1.738 (0.765)
1.337 (0.808)
0.0899 (0.526)
0.0766 (0.568)
0.327** (0.015) 
0.326** (0.015) 
0.324** (0.016)
1040.489
1040.138 
1045.035 
1040.158 
1044.769 
Mortality from high risk conditions -1.412 (0.826)
-1.540 (0.805)
0.0203 (0.897)
0.0164 (0.914)
0.0746 (0.642) 
0.0763 (0.634) 
0.0736 (0.647)
1068.622
1073.415 
1078.310 
1068.655 
1078.360 
Mortality from low risk conditions -18.10 (0.337)
-17.85 (0.331)
-0.587 (0.201)
-0.582 (0.193)
0.0369 (0.803) 
0.0257 (0.862) 
0.0210 (0.887)
1374.385
1380.252 
1384.267 
1373.632 
1383.524 
Deaths after surgery -3.266 (0.847)
-3.533 (0.828)
-0.0771 (0.851)
-0.0822 (0.836)
0.162 (0.263) 
0.163 (0.261) 
0.163 (0.262)
1342.844
1346.625 
1351.533 
1342.847 
1351.538 
Deaths resulting from hip fracture -0.443 (0.978)
-1.676 (0.913)
0.136 (0.724)
0.101 (0.790)
0.0977 (0.526) 
0.0998 (0.520) 
0.0911 (0.559)
1323.971
1328.531 
1333.475 
1323.840 
1333.416 
In-hospital stroke mortality -3.965 (0.666)
-3.914 (0.661)
-0.0502 (0.823)
-0.0484 (0.824)
0.0383 (0.801) 
0.0368 (0.809) 
0.0372 (0.807)
1169.743
1174.833 
1179.596 
1169.887 
1179.740 
Observations: 142.  p-values in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8.  Spatial models of hospital competition and risk adjusted readmission, revision 
and redo rates (60 minutes  car drive time catchment area) 
Competition
measure: number 
of rivals weighted 
by distance 
Competition
measure:  number 
of rivals 
ρ
(Spatial quality 
lag) 
BIC
Hip replacement readmis-
sions 
36.59** (0.031)
39.55** (0.020)
0.752* (0.071)
0.824** (0.049)
-0.0239 (0.880) 
-0.116 (0.476) 
-0.108 (0.512)
1344.603
1354.374 
1354.003 
1346.020 
1355.498 
Knee replacement readmissions 27.21 (0.264)
18.45 (0.441)
0.456 (0.445)
0.202 (0.731)
0.260* (0.057) 
0.237* (0.092) 
0.248* (0.079)
1447.455
1450.331 
1454.693 
1448.150 
1455.169 
Stroke readmission  within
28 days 
6.722 (0.605)
5.361 (0.671)
0.139 (0.662)
0.0987 (0.749)
0.162 (0.250) 
0.156 (0.270) 
0.157 (0.269)
1268.995
1272.948 
1277.724 
1269.075 
1277.802 
Hip revisions and manipulations 
within  1 year 
-0.176 (0.677)
-0.166 (0.686)
-0.00228 (0.824)
-0.00214 (0.830)
0.120 (0.460) 
0.118 (0.469) 
0.119 (0.463)
295.214
299.821 
304.613 
295.346 
304.731 
Knee revisions and manipulations 
within  1 year 
0.188 (0.671)
0.221 (0.606)
0.00781 (0.470)
0.00896 (0.391)
-0.248 (0.248) 
-0.255 (0.235) 
-0.265 (0.218)
309.765
313.566 
318.257 
309.404 
317.789 
Hip  fracture - Operation given
within  2 days 
-9.058 (0.261)
-8.503 (0.280)
-0.300 (0.125)
-0.287 (0.134)
0.0977 (0.482) 
0.0791 (0.573) 
0.0699 (0.619)
1132.831
1138.634 
1142.428 
1131.695 
1141.361 
Redo rates for prostate resection -3.608** (0.010)
-3.886*** (0.006)
-0.0957*** (0.005)
-0.104*** (0.003)
-0.00273 (0.985) 
-0.109 (0.458) 
-0.125 (0.396)
636.635
648.425 
645.992 
635.347 
644.536 
Observations: 142.   p-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table  9. Spatial models of hospital competition and patient experience (60 minutes  car 
drive time catchment area) 
Competition
measure: number 
of rivals weighted 
by distance 
Competition
measure:  number of 
rivals 
ρ
(Spatial quality 
lag) 
BIC
Clean Hospital room/ward -1.012 (0.545)
-1.007 (0.535)
-0.0317 (0.436)
-0.0317 (0.422)
0.0880 (0.553) 
0.0876 (0.554) 
0.0881 (0.552)
686.299
691.294 
695.865 
686.046 
695.608 
Involved in decisions -3.207* (0.095)
-2.733 (0.136)
-0.104** (0.025)
-0.0910** (0.041)
0.310** (0.010) 
0.292** (0.017) 
0.281** (0.021)
725.837
727.686 
730.430 
723.560 
728.507 
Trust in doctors -0.577 (0.665)
-0.467 (0.715)
-0.0302 (0.351)
-0.0276 (0.376)
0.212* (0.098) 
0.209 (0.102) 
0.206 (0.107)
621.582
624.112 
628.935 
620.863 
628.285 
Observations: 142. p-values in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 10.  Spatial models of hospital competition and risk adjusted mortality 
rates (98 minutes  car drive time catchment area) 
Competition
measure: number 
of rivals weighted 
by distance 
Competition
measure:  number 
of rivals 
ρ
(Spatial quality 
lag) 
BIC
Overall mortality rate 3.164 (0.442)
1.523 (0.703)
0.0774 (0.263)
0.0490 (0.467)
0.423** (0.020) 
0.410** (0.028) 
0.396** (0.036)
1074.123
1075.048 
1079.893 
1073.426 
1079.510 
Mortality from high risk conditions -1.502 (0.745)
-2.461 (0.587)
-0.00532 (0.945)
-0.0200 (0.793)
0.233 (0.277) 
0.255 (0.239) 
0.243 (0.263)
1107.597
1111.582 
1116.278 
1107.704 
1116.504 
Mortality from low risk conditions -7.262 (0.586)
-7.405 (0.573)
-0.131 (0.559)
-0.133 (0.545)
0.00322 (0.990) 
-0.0178 (0.943) 
-0.0157 (0.949)
1419.839
1425.143 
1429.815 
1419.791 
1429.768 
Deaths after surgery 13.21 (0.268)
10.47 (0.367)
0.294 (0.141)
0.250 (0.199)
0.341* (0.081) 
0.315 (0.115) 
0.304 (0.128)
1386.961
1390.473 
1394.651 
1385.980 
1393.824 
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 2.911 (0.794)
3.262 (0.768)
0.0968 (0.607)
0.104 (0.576)
-0.0328 (0.903) 
-0.0477 (0.863) 
-0.0594 (0.830)
1367.786
1372.833 
1377.737 
1367.578 
1377.512 
In-hospital stroke mortality -5.467 (0.438)
-6.194 (0.368)
-0.0674 (0.570)
-0.0837 (0.472)
0.192 (0.433) 
0.218 (0.369) 
0.219 (0.369)
1232.197
1237.237 
1241.419 
1232.491 
1241.713 
Observations: 147.  p-values in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 11.  Spatial models of hospital competition and risk adjusted readmission, revision  
and redo rates (98 minutes car drive time catchment area) 
Competition
measure: number
of rivals weighted 
by distance
Competition
measure:  number
of rivals 
ρ
(Spatial quality 
lag) 
BIC
Hip replacement
readmissions 
35.71*** (0.004)
33.30*** (0.008)
0.536** (0.010)
0.489** (0.020)
0.317 (0.131) 
0.146 (0.530) 
0.178 (0.438)
1396.586
1408.114 
1406.184 
1398.392 
1407.793 
Knee replacement
readmissions 
35.35** (0.037)
31.17* (0.070)
0.579** (0.043)
0.508* (0.078)
0.296 (0.148) 
0.188 (0.394) 
0.195 (0.376)
1490.875
1498.441 
1500.158 
1491.119 
1500.350 
Stroke readmission within
28 days 
11.84 (0.195)
8.008 (0.386)
0.192 (0.212)
0.116 (0.465)
0.330* (0.081) 
0.279 (0.167) 
0.278 (0.178)
1308.774
1312.730 
1316.969 
1308.897 
1317.186 
Hip revisions and 
manipulations  within  1 year
-0.0556 (0.852)
-0.0129 (0.964)
0.000738 (0.883)
0.00128 (0.792)
0.303 (0.178) 
0.302 (0.183) 
0.308 (0.172)
301.723
305.102 
310.091 
301.737 
310.023 
Knee revisions and 
manipulations  within  1 year
0.0539 (0.864)
0.0482 (0.874)
0.00223 (0.675)
0.00240 (0.639)
-0.404 (0.232) 
-0.403 (0.233) 
-0.409 (0.227)
319.079
322.606 
327.571 
318.923 
327.377 
Hip fracture  Operation
given within  2 days 
-5.137 (0.366)
-4.614 (0.415)
-0.0653 (0.495)
-0.0565 (0.551)
0.117 (0.538) 
0.0824 (0.674) 
0.0956 (0.623)
1168.682
1174.162 
1178.488 
1169.054 
1178.797 
Redo rates for prostate
resection 
-2.835*** (0.004)
-3.224*** (0.002)
-0.0429*** (0.010)
-0.0464*** (0.006)
0.00318 (0.990) 
-0.296 (0.285) 
-0.195 (0.465)
652.938
666.479 
661.744 
654.603 
664.038 
Observations: 147.  p-values in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 12.  Spatial models of hospital competition and patient experience (98 minutes car 
drive time catchment area) 
Competition
measure: number 
of rivals weighted 
by distance 
Competition
measure:  number 
of rivals 
ρ
(Spatial quality 
lag) 
BIC
Clean Hospital room/ward -1.152 (0.331)
-1.088 (0.345)
-0.0229 (0.250)
-0.0210 (0.285)
0.166 (0.474) 
0.147 (0.528) 
0.119 (0.618)
707.741
713.234 
717.337 
707.348 
717.086 
Involved in decisions -4.955*** (0.000)
-3.736*** (0.007)
-0.0964*** (0.000)
-0.0778*** (0.002)
0.555*** (0.000) 
0.388** (0.027) 
0.275 (0.159)
743.271
751.096 
748.880 
738.280 
746.400 
Trust in doctors -1.859** (0.046)
-1.213 (0.195)
-0.0414*** (0.008)
-0.0294* (0.073)
0.460*** (0.005) 
0.392** (0.027) 
0.328* (0.083)
637.729
639.994 
643.307 
634.549 
641.771 
Observations: 147.  p-values in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
